@mauve At least for the bittorrent DHT the most common implementations (utorrent and libtorrent) are pretty careful not to enable large scale amplification attacks. Nodes don't advertise the addresses of other nodes until they've been verified and retries to unverified addresses are severely limited.
@mauve Also adding an address to a torrent entry requires a three-way handshake which prevents address spoofing.
@magila I don't think you need to attack the DHT topology for a DoS though. You can advertise from seemingly legit IPs to regular DHT nodes and either overload them, or add a bunch of these junk entries that refuse to serve the content.
Like, *chan types used to use LoIC a lot for getting random people to just run a tool which would help with DoS. Feels like there should be a similar one for p2p content by now. Maybe #dweb stuff just isn't popular enough still.